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Abstract: Western legislatures tend towards the use of regulatory policies that 
favour strong intellectual property rights over public access in the battle to regulate file 
sharing. It has become apparent that the legislature is increasingly relying on code-based 
regulation in order to detect infringement, to identify those infringing, and to enforce the 
law through technical measures. This paper will assess the efficacy of regulation by code in 
the context of Lessig’s assertion that “code is law”, as applied to the file sharing 
community. The conclusion will reveal a significant asymmetry between the intended 
application of the regulatory influence of code and its de facto applicability in the online 
environment.                                   
1.  Introduction 
Western legislatures are increasingly tending towards the use regulatory policies that favour strong 
intellectual property rights over public access in the battle to regulate file sharing. One of the ways in 
which such policies are being implemented is through the increase in the scope of the protections afforded 
in the digital age, specifically through the growing use of code-based regulation. The civil and criminal 
aspects of legislation largely operate as legal regulation imposed at the content level. But since the WIPO 
Treaty laid down obligations to protect digital rights management (DRM) and technical prevention 
measures (TPMs)1, the regulatory latitude has increased its reach beyond the scope of the content level 
into the logical level. It has also become apparent that the legislature is increasingly relying on code-
based regulation in order to detect infringement, to identify those infringing, and to enforce the law 
through technical measures. This paper will assess the efficacy of regulation by code in the context of 
Lessig’s assertion that “code is law”, as applied to the file sharing community. The conclusion will reveal 
a significant asymmetry between the intended application of the regulatory influence of code and its de 
facto applicability in the online environment2. 
2.  Regulation Applied to the Institutional Ecology through Layering 
The origins of the layers of regulation can be traced back to the seminal International Standards 
Organization / Open Systems Interconnection (ISO/OSI) depiction of layered architecture representative 
of the networked environment. The model presents seven layers that are organised hierarchically and 
depend upon one another in order to function. The seven layers, from top to bottom, are the application 
layer, the presentation layer, the session layer, the transport layer, the network layer, the data link layer 
and the physical layer3. Berners-Lee later demonstrated how the stack could be reformulated into a four-
layered model, namely (again, from top to bottom) the content layer, the software layer, the computer 
                                                 
1
 This is embodied in the US by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, and the UK by Arts 6 & 7 EU Copyright 
Directive which led to the required protections being added to the CDPA. 
2
 Bambauer points out that “A generation of Internet scholars has sought to apply Lessig’s New Chicago School 
modalities to regulatory problems. Yet, scholars have not acknowledged that these four forces are not merely ways of 
regulating – they also describe ways to limit regulation”, at Bambauer DE, Orwell's Armchair (Research Paper No. 
247, Brooklyn Law School 2011), 41. The assessment of the efficacy of regulation by code in this paper answers 
Bambauer’s call by considering not only how the architecture of code is used to regulate, but also how it can be used 
to circumvent constraint, detection and enforcement. 
3
 Comer DE, Internetworking with TCP/IP principles, Protocols and Architecture (4 edn, Prentice Hall 2004), 159. 
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hardware layer and the transmission medium layer4. By refining the ISO/OSI model, Berners-Lee 
effectively condensed the varied technical functions underpinning the online environment into a stack of 
software and hardware architectures that can more readily be considered in a regulatory context. The 
content layer broadly describes the end-user experience from the perspective of a user of the internet 
browsing the World Wide Web through a browser window, whereas the software layer is indicative of the 
internet protocol that allows the World Wide Web to function5. The computer hardware is indicative of 
the machines through which access is made and internet packets routed, whereas the transmission 
medium roughly describes the “wired” telephone system to which terminals are connected to access the 
internet6. Benkler refines the stack further still into a three-tiered environment7 that he describes as the 
institutional ecology of the networked information environment8. The layers in Benkler’s stack start at the 
top again with the content layer, which similarly encompasses the data and information that can be 
typically accessed by a user on an internet-connected device. The software layer is repurposed as the 
logical layer, but again encompasses the internet protocol that the World Wide Web is built upon. The 
lowest layer takes the bottom two layers of Berners-Lee’s model and combines them into a single 
physical layer9 encompassing the computer layer – namely, the machines that are connected to the 
internet, such as the user’s PC and router – and the transmission layer that includes the hardware of which 
the internet itself is made up. 
The majority of legal intellectual property regulation provided by the legislature is applicable at the 
content level, in that the granting of a monopoly right on informational content creates legal barriers that 
seek to prevent the end user from accessing, distributing, remixing, or carrying out any other action 
related to the work that has not been authorised by the rights holder. These legal barriers are artificial in 
the sense that they would not exist naturally in the digital environment, and thus they must be created and 
applied by the legislature. This becomes relevant when the interrelations between the hierarchies of the 
stack are considered10. It will be recalled that the ISO/OSI model and Berners-Lee’s four-layered model 
are organised hierarchically, and are dependent upon one another to operate. The consequence of this is 
that each layer of the stack will always be capable of being influenced by the layer or layers below it, but 
not by the layer or layers above it. So in the case of Benkler’s model of the institutional ecology, the 
content layer can be influenced by regulation on the content layer, the code layer and the physical layer. 
The code layer can similarly be influenced by regulation applied on the code layer and the physical layer, 
but regulation applied at the content layer cannot directly influence it11. Thus, the physical layer can only 
be influenced by regulation directly applied at that layer, but is unaffected by regulation applied to the 
upper layers12. To illustrate this rule in the context of intellectual property regulation, the legal construct 
of copyright tends to be directly applied at the content level13. With this in mind, it becomes clear why the 
legislature has become keen to apply regulation through the use of code to content that can be shared in 
the networked information environment. If regulation can be successfully applied at the code level, which 
by definition utilises the architecture of the internet, then the principle suggests that this would be more 
effective than the artificial barriers applied at the content level through direct legal regulation. In order to 
uncover why this has not proven to be the case, it is necessary to explore the code layer in more detail. 
                                                 
4
 Berners-Lee T, Weaving the Web: The Past, Present and Future of the World Wide Web by its Inventor (Texere 
Publishing 2000), 124 et seq. 
5
 Benkler Y, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedoms (Yale University 
Press 2006), 384. 
6
 Ibid. 384. 
7
 Benkler Y, ‘From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons 
and User Access’ (2000) 52 Federal Communications Law Journal 561, 562. 
8
 Benkler Y, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedoms (Yale University 
Press 2006), 395. 
9
 Murray AD, The Regulation of Cyberspace: Control in the Online Environment (Routledge-Cavendish 2004), 44. 
10
 Bailey J, ‘Of Mediums and Metaphors: How a Layered Methodology Might Contribute to Constitutional Analysis 
of Internet Content Regulation’ (2004) 30 Manitoba Law Journal 197, 200. 
11
 Lane TA, ‘Of Hammers and Saws: The Toolbox of Federalism and Sources of Law for the Web’ (2003) 33 New 
Mexico Law Review 115, 116. 
12
 McTaggart C, ‘A Layered Approach to Internet Legal Analysis’ (2003) 48 McGill Law Journal 571 
13
 Directly applied in this context means purely and directly through the application of rights, restrictions and 
enforcement at a purely legal level, applied to content or an end user. In the case of copyright, this will take the form 
of the rights given to the holder of the copyright granting them an exclusive monopoly to carry out certain actions 
with the work. 
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3.  Regulating the Logical Protocols and Architecture of the Internet 
One of the many motivations behind the formation of the internet was the desire for compatibility and 
interoperability. While communication was the driving factor, the US Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (ARPA) needed a network that was capable of effecting this communication between computers 
that were each built from differing hardware, and running software that was not inherently compatible 
with the software run by other computers. The solution to this problem was brought about by the 
development of the interface message processor (IMP). This was a form of black box that resided 
between the computer and the network, and acted as an interface that was capable of breaking down data 
into packets and sending them to other computers on the network via their IMPs through a series of hops. 
Although this sounds prima facie similar to roles undertaken by modern internet devices, modems and 
internet routers, the technique behind the packet transmission was in fact quite distinct. Although the 
system utilised packet switching, it had been designed in a time when computers were prohibitively 
expensive, and were thus used on a time-share basis. This meant that the system was designed to be 
reliable, but not expected to be slowed by congestion. Also, the fact that the packet-switching was 
handled by IMPs apart from the terminal meant that users had no real control over the network 
protocols14. In essence, the Network Control Program (NCP) was a closed system unsuited to managing a 
diverse set of traffic types or network loads15. A French researcher16 sought to improve upon the design of 
the NCP over what had become known as ARPANET17 and, with the funding of what was then known as 
the French Institut de Recherche d'lnformatique et d'Automatique (IRIA), designed an alternative network 
named CYCLADES. The key to the shift in the design ethic evident in CYCLADES was in the CIGALE 
packet switching network, which sacrificed some of the reliability of the NCP used by ARPANET by 
removing the verification of correct delivery in order to improve its efficiency. By changing the 
architecture of the packet-switching system so that the work was taken out of the network and placed in 
the hands of the host terminals, two key attributes present in the modern internet were born. These were 
the host-to-host principle of system design, and the layered architecture model which consisted of the data 
transmission layer, the transport layer and the application layer18. This openness allowed for a simplicity 
of design that provided a cheaper infrastructure, consisting of standard computers, that was vastly 
superior to ARPANET running NCP in that research was allowed to drive the evolution of network 
research and new technologies19. 
This was not lost on the researchers working to improve the NCP on ARPANET20 who, with the 
assistance of one of the researchers who had originally worked with Pouzin on CYCLADES21, went on to 
design the transmission control protocol (TCP) and internet protocol (IP) for ARPANET. This was based 
on the same open characteristics and design principles evident in CYCLADES and the CIGALE packet 
switching subnet22. Although fellow ARPANET researcher Roberts was sceptical of the value of moving 
the control of the network outside of the network itself and into the host computers in a public network23, 
the TCP/IP protocol still forms the contemporary underlying structure of the internet24. The host-to-host 
principle at the heart of the design of TCP/IP that had been adopted from CIGANE/CYCLADES was 
described in a highly influential paper by the three former MIT researchers, Saltzer, Reed and Clark, as 
                                                 
14
 Roberts LG, ‘Multiple Computer Networks and Intercomputer Communication’ [1967] Proceedings of the First 
ACM Symposium on Operating System Principles 1, 3.1. 
15
 Bennett R, Designed for Change: End-to-End Arguments, Internet Innovation, and Net Neutrality Debate (The 
Information Technology & Innovation Foundation 2009), 9. 
16
 Louis Pouzin. 
17
 Werbach K, ‘The Centripital Network: How the Internet Holds Itself Together, and the Forces Tearing it Apart’ 
(2008) 42 University of California, Davis Law Review 343, 400. 
18
 Bochmann GV and Goyer P, ‘Datagrams as a public packet-switched data transmission service’ (Department of 
Communications of Canada, March 1977) <http://www.rfc-editor.org/ien/ien17.pdf> accessed May 2012, 5. 
19
 Pouzin L, ‘CIGALE, The Packet Switching Machine of the CYCLADES Computer Network’ (1974) Proceedings 
of the International Federation for Information Processing 155, 155. 
20
 Vint Cerf, Robert Kahn, and Robert Metcalfe. 
21
 Gerard Le Lann. 
22
 Cerf V and Kahn R, ‘A Protocol for Packet Network Interconnection’ (1974) 22(5) IEEE Transactions on 
Communications 627, passim. 
23
 Roberts LG, ‘The Evolution of Packet Switching’ (1978) 66(11) Proceedings of the IEEE 1, 3. 
24
 TCP/IP systems took over from the last NCP hosts on ARPANET on 1st January 1983. 
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the end-to-end principle of network design25. The functioning of this principle in the context of TCP/IP 
can be thought of in terms of the three layers representative of the network. At the application layer is the 
application and software data and code that needs to be sent to other machines and received by the local 
machine. The protocol achieves this by taking the data into the transport layer and splitting it into small 
chunks known as packets26. The packets are then wrapped in a container of code that identifies where the 
packet has been created and what the destination is. The packets then, within the data transmission layer 
(i.e. the hardware, wires and radio spectrum that form the backbone of the network between hosts27), will 
individually begin hopping from node to node within the network until they arrive at their destination. 
The destination terminal will then utilise the protocol at the transport layer to remove the packets from 
their containers and reassemble them into a complete piece of code or instruction, where it re-enters the 
application layer28. 
Although this technically describes the internet, it was not until later that what has become known as 
the World Wide Web was developed on top of the TCP/IP protocol by Berners-Lee. What had been 
ARPANET had expanded greatly by this point, and had grown from a single closed network into an array 
of many networks that were interconnected so they operated as one. While working at the European 
Organisation for Nuclear Research (CERN), Berners-Lee designed and built a web that would run on top 
of TCP/IP protocols29. This included a browser that could access areas known as websites on what would 
become the World Wide Web that were written in Hypertext Markup Language (HTML), and served to 
end user terminals utilising HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP). This in itself formed an infrastructure. 
Like the TCP/IP protocols on which it relied to work, the World Wide Web was designed with a similar 
view to interoperability, compatibility and, crucially, with an open and end-to-end design ethic30. This 
mix of tools that allowed for web browsing and e-mail to become synonymous was then donated by 
CERN to the public domain, guaranteeing its continued openness31. This, along with the opening of the 
underlying network to the open market, spurred the World Wide Web to enter into ubiquity32. Together, 
the World Wide Web utilising the architecture of the internet saw a massive expansion in its online 
population during the 1990s, as the popularisation of the internet prompted businesses and the public 
alike to join what had become the digital revolution. As the end-to-end principle behind the design of the 
TCP/IP protocol had been preserved in the architecture of the World Wide Web, little had changed in 
terms of how data was transmitted33. Except now, the data at Berners-Lee’s application layer could now 
also be content, which is why Benkler has repurposed this as the content layer. Any content that is 
capable of being rendered digitally and stored on a computer is now capable of being transmitted over the 
internet34, such as, for example, a piece of music that has been converted into the mp3 format. Such an 
mp3 file is formed of data that can be split up into small data packets at the logical layer, or the code layer 
if Lessig’s definition is to be preferred35, and packed into a container that also holds the originating 
internet protocol (IP) address and the destination IP address. The data packet will then be passed into the 
                                                 
25
 Sometimes referred to as the e2e principle; see Saltzer JH, Reed DP and Clark DD, ‘End-to-End Arguments in 
System Design’ [1981] Second International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, 509, 509; Reed DP, 
Saltzer JH and Clark DD, ‘Comment on Active Networking and End-to-End Arguments’ (1998) 12 IEEE Network 3, 
69; & Lemley MA and Lessig L, ‘The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the 
Broadband Era’ (2000) 48 UCLA Law Review 925, 928. 
26
 Bochmann GV and Goyer P, ‘Datagrams as a public packet-switched data transmission service’ (Department of 
Communications of Canada, March 1977) <http://www.rfc-editor.org/ien/ien17.pdf> accessed May 2012, 8. 
27
 The data transmission layer is used here in the context of merging Berners-Lee’s computer hardware layer and 
transmission layer. 
28
 Ibid. 9; & Gralla P, How the Internet Works (Que 1999), 24. 
29
 Sunstein points out that CERN unsuccessfully attempted to attract interest from private companies in the building 
of the World Wide Web, leaving Berners-Lee to take on the project independently: Sunstein CR, Republic.com 2.0 
(Princeton University Press 2007), 158. 
30
 Berners-Lee T, Hendler T and Ora L, ‘The Semantic Web’ (2001) 5 Scientific American 35, 36. 
31
 Murray AD, The Regulation of Cyberspace: Control in the Online Environment (Routledge-Cavendish 2007), 72. 
32
 Alesso HP, Thinking on the Web: Berners Lee, Godel and Turing (Wiley-Blackwell 2008), 64. 
33
 Palfrey J and Rogoyski R, ‘The Move to the Middle: The Enduring Threat of Harmful Speech to the End-to-End 
Principle’ (2006) 21 Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 31, 57. 
34
 Although the internet can specifically describe the network at the TCP/IP layer and the World Wide Web describes 
what we now view as “cyberspace”, many commentators still also refer to the latter as the internet. As the World 
Wide Web runs within the TCP/IP layer, it is still technically part of the internet. Thus, these commentators are not at 
error, and so the internet will be occasionally used here to describe both the TCP/IP network and the World Wide 
Web as a whole. 
35
 Lessig L, The Future Of Ideas: The Fate Of The Commons In A Connected World (Random House 2002), 48. 
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physical layer where it will hop from node to node through the network until it reaches the router or 
modem attached to the account associated with the destination IP address. This will pass the packet back 
into the code layer where the pieces can be reassembled and the container removed, before the completely 
reformed mp3 file is passed back into the content layer where it can be accessed by the end user. This 
broadly describes a greatly simplified version of the process that would take place if a user was to send an 
mp3 music file from their computer to another user over the internet. 
4.  Transposing Physical Architecture as Regulation to the Networked 
Environment 
File sharing is frequently regulated through the application of legal barriers at the content level. From a 
purely technical point of view this means little, as barriers imposed by legal regulation at the content level 
can only be applied in an artificial sense that is separated from the concerns of the network36. However, as 
the popularity of the World Wide Web has continued to rapidly increase, it has been argued that 
regulation need not be restricted to being an artificial construct, but could also be applied at the logical 
layer in the guise of architectural design37. Reidenberg formulated this thesis as Lex Informatica38. 
Inspired by the mix of customs, norms and practices that formed what became Lex Mercatoria among 
European merchant seamen throughout the middle ages, Reidenberg observed that a similar blend of 
practice and conflicting laws could be shaped into an equivalent Lex Informatica on the internet using its 
plasticity39. Reidenberg took the theory much further than his analogy would have suggested by pointing 
out that regulation can not only be applied through the design of the internet, but that such regulation 
should be hard wired into the architecture of the network itself40. Further, the law should be used to 
provide backing for this. Lessig expanded upon this theory greatly, coining the concept that “code is 
law”41. Lessig observed the difference initially illustrated by Reidenberg concerning the distinction 
between regulation by law being influenced by government, and regulation by code being influenced by 
technologists, and categorised these as East Coast and West Coast law. While East Coast law traditionally 
takes a top-down approach to regulation, West Coast law tends towards taking a bottom-up approach42. 
However, although this often proves to be the focal point of conflict due to the technologists with whom 
West Coast law originates generally favouring openness and generativity over the restrictiveness 
preferred by the legislature, the two are not mutually exclusive. Just as regulation by code can be ordained 
by the legislature, so it can also receive legal backing. But if regulation at the code layer affects regulation 
at the content layer, it may be wondered why legal regulation does not take a back seat to regulation by 
code. The answer to this question lies in the underlying efficacy of how regulation by code can be applied 
to prevent users of the internet from engaging in file sharing, and how it can further be utilised to 
strengthen enforcement from the legal perspective. 
 
 
 
                                                 
36
 Lessig L, Code Version 2.0 (2nd edn, Basic Books 2006), 3. 
37
 See, for example, Ibid. 1; & Benkler Y, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and 
Freedoms (Yale University Press 2006), 17. 
38
 Reidenberg JR, ‘Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology’ (1998) 76:3 
Texas Law Review 553, 553. 
39
 A term used by Licklider and Taylor to describe how, in the digital context, the medium through which information 
flows can be considered to be a programmable model that can be moulded to influence its outcome: Licklider JCR 
and Taylor RW, ‘The Computer as a Communication Device’ (1968) 4 Science and Technology 21, 22. 
40
 Reidenberg, ibid. 
41
 Lessig L, ‘The Limits in Open Code’ (1999) 14 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 759, 761. 
42
 Lessig L, Code Version 2.0 (2nd edn, Basic Books 2006), 72. 
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5.  Using the Law to Enforce Regulation by Code 
5.1 The First Generation: Napster 
The law has had some success in regulating file sharing through regulating against code itself. Its greatest 
achievements are centred on the legal battles against the peer-to-peer sites that started to appear at around 
the turn of the 21st century43. The first of these involved Napster. Napster was introduced as a US concern 
in 1999 as a centralised means of sharing files with other users on the Napster network, most commonly 
music in the form of mp3 files44. After registering on the website, client software could be downloaded 
and installed onto the end user’s computer45. The client software would then index any music files that 
were stored in the shared folder on the user’s computer. This index was then transmitted to the Napster 
server, where it was kept with the index files of all other users of the Napster network. A user would then 
be able to carry out searches through the client. These would involve entering the name of a track or artist 
into the search window, which would then prompt the search engine to check the indexes held on the 
central server for matches. The client would subsequently display any matches on the user’s screen. When 
a file was selected, the client would then contact the host machine where the track was stored, which was 
usually a computer belonging to another individual user running the Napster client. The track would then 
be broken up and transmitted from the host computer to the computer of the user who had made the 
search46 in a similar manner to the process described above. Assuming the user did not move the newly 
downloaded track out of their shared folder, it would then become indexed and available for other users 
of the network to download through the client. In the well-documented legal case that followed, it was the 
fact that Napster held a centralised index that ultimately led to the finding of liability for contributory 
infringement under the US Copyright Act47. But most significantly, it was the centralised architecture of 
Napster that allowed the network to be shut down with such relative ease48. By successfully ordering the 
central server to cease operation, the network became practically useless, and thus the computers of 
individual users who had Napster clients installed no longer operated as a file sharing network. Legal 
regulation, in the form of the order to close the central server, had successfully been used to regulate 
using code, in that the central server was removed from the network. 
5.2 The Second Generation: Gnutella and FastTrack-based Networks 
The second generation of peer-to-peer networks, including Kazaa and Grokster, moved away from the 
centralisation that has made Napster so technically and legally vulnerable49. In its stead was a largely 
decentralised network50. As with Napster, Kazaa required users to download client software from its 
website which created an index of all of the files51 that the users had placed in their sharing folders. To 
make a search, a user would again submit a query through the client installed on their computer. 
However, instead of querying a central server, the client software would connect with a supernode52. 
Supernodes were in fact computers belonging to other users of the Kazaa network that the software had 
                                                 
43
 Johns describes the evolution of file sharing networks as being in three generations, that is, the first generation 
being Napster, the second being Gnutella and FastTrack-type networks like Morpheus, Grokster and Kazaa, and the 
third being BitTorrent, at Johns A, Piracy: The Intellectual Property Wars from Gutenberg to Gates (The University 
of Chicago Press 2009), 454. 
44
 See David M, Peer to Peer and the Music Industry: The Criminalization of Sharing (Sage Publications 2010), 33; 
& Palfrey J and Gasser U, Born Digital: Understanding the First Generation of Digital Natives (Basic Books 2008), 
132. 
45
 Askanazi J and others, ‘The Fate of Napster: Digital Downloading Faces and Uphill Battle’ (2001) 13 Duke Law & 
Technology Review 1, para.5. 
46
 Hence the term peer-to-peer. 
47
 Ss.106, 115 & 501 US Copyright Act, 17 USC. 
48
 David M and Kirkhope J, ‘New Digital Technologies: Privacy / Property, Globalization and Law’ (2004) 3(4) 
Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 437, 438. 
49
 David suggests that the criminalisation of Napster drove the development of decentralised file sharing networks, at 
David, supra, 35. 
50
 Askanazi J and others, ‘The Fate of Napster: Digital Downloading Faces and Uphill Battle’ (2001) 13 Duke Law & 
Technology Review 1, para.30. 
51
 Not just music files, as with Napster. 
52
 Hyland M, ‘MGM v Grokster: Has the Copyright Pendulum Started to Swing Towards Copyright Holders?’ (2005) 
11(8) Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 232, 233. 
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deemed superior to other computers in the network due to factors such as connection speed and 
processing power53. Supernodes would be given responsibility of around 100 other users of the network, 
known as nodes. After the client software successfully connected with the supernode, the supernode 
would query the nodes it was responsible for with the searched-for term. The supernode would also 
transmit the search-term to another supernode which would carry out an identical query with its own 
nodes, and again send the search term onto another supernode. If the search-term was matched to a file 
hosted on a node, this would be communicated back to the user who made the search. If the user chose to 
download the file, their computer would link with the node hosting the file, and it would be transferred 
similarly to the cases described above. Although Kazaa and other file sharing networks using the 
FastTrack protocol are often described as decentralised networks, this is only partially true, as some 
centralisation took place. When the client software was initially downloaded, it would contain a 
preliminary list of supernodes in its cache. This list would be also be updated from time to time from the 
central server. However, only the initial list of supernodes was strictly necessary, as supernodes contained 
updated lists of other supernodes it was aware of that could be transmitted to users connecting to them in 
order to update their caches with functioning nodes54. Although these types of network do not have a 
critical point of failure, as the Napster network has in its central server, networks using the FastTrack 
protocol nevertheless suffered when their central points were removed, as with Kazaa and Grokster. 
Without a central server to keep a list of supernodes updated, new users of the network who have 
managed to obtain the client software from alternative sources have to suffice with the initial list of 
supernodes. Although the supernodes themselves carry updated lists, the gradually shrinking network will 
become less and less efficient until new users have difficulty locating supernodes, and those that remain 
only have access to nodes with a limited selection of files available for sharing. So, although the shutting 
down of Kazaa and Grokster did not have the same catastrophic effect on their respective networks, the 
combination of the weakened supernode updating and the migration of users to alternative networks 
eventually had the same effect of crippling the networks of their effective function55. Thus again, the legal 
regulation had successfully been utilised to regulate through the use of code56. 
5.3 The Third Generation: BitTorrent 
After the second generation of peer-to-peer networks came a transition into completely decentralised 
networking, and with it a change in regulatory approach. Where code had successfully been used to target 
the backbone of the networks themselves, the pinnacle of the third generation of file sharing networks, 
BitTorrent, was designed to be effectively immune from this kind of interference57. A user wishing to 
download a file would again be required to install client software but, unlike with the previous generation 
of file sharing networks, the client software does not carry out indexing of files on their host computers, 
and searches are predominantly carried out outside of the network. When a user wishes to share a file, the 
most common way of doing so is through creating a torrent file. This file contains information that will 
allow BitTorrent clients to identify the relevant file being shared and a list of trackers associated with it58. 
Trackers are servers that keep lists of other computers running the BitTorrent client software that contain 
all or part of the relevant file. If a user wishes to find a file that is being shared within the network, the 
most common way of doing so is by searching the World Wide Web for a torrent file that relates to the 
content the user wishes to download. This can be done through a general search engine such as Google or 
Microsoft Bing, or through a website that is dedicated to indexing torrent files such as The Pirate Bay59. 
The user can then download the torrent file associated with the file they wish to download. Once run, the 
torrent file gives the client information on the file to be downloaded so that it can be identified, and 
                                                 
53
 Strowel A, Peer-to-Peer File Sharing and Secondary Liability in Copyright Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2009), 
2. 
54
 Akester P, ‘Copyright and the P2P Challenge’ (2005) 27(3) European Intellectual Property Review 106, 111. 
55
 For discussion on how scalability affects efficiency in peer to peer networks based on the Gnutella protocol, which 
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provides it with a list of trackers to connect to60. The client will then query the tracker with regards to the 
file, and the tracker will respond with the addresses of any hosts that contain all of the file (seeders), or 
part of the file (leechers). 
 Figure 1: 
 
The client will then connect directly to any computers that contain all or some of the file, 
independently of the tracker. The clients on these computers then break up copies of whatever proportion 
of the file they are hosting into packets, and these packets are sent to the computer requesting the file. 
What sets BitTorrent apart from the networks described above is the distributed method it uses for getting 
the file to the downloader, as the only instance a complete file will be downloaded exclusively from a 
single seeder is if the seeder and downloader remain the only two computers in the web of computers 
uploading and downloading that particular file, which is called the swarm61. Often, another user will run 
the same torrent file before the first downloader has finished downloading a complete copy of the file. As 
they do so, their client will query the tracker which will pass on the details of both the original seeder and 
the new leecher, which is now seeding the packets that it has already downloaded from the original 
seeder. This new client will then enter the swarm by connecting to the original seeder and the first 
leecher, and will begin to receive different packets from the file from both computers. This too will begin 
seeding the packets it receives to other computers in the swarm as soon as it receives them. 
 Figure 2: 
 
                                                 
60
 Cohen, supra. 
61
 Ibid, 1. 
  
 
  
  
Code is Law? Assessing Architectural File Sharing Regulation in the Online Environment 
  
 
 
89 
 
When a computer has received enough packets to form the complete file, the client software will 
reassemble the packets into a perfect copy of the original file, even though it may have received these 
packets from many different computers. The client will then continue to seed the packets that make up the 
complete file until the user intervenes or disconnects from the network. 
 
Figure 3: 
 
 
Although there are many differences between the network architecture of BitTorrent and the previous 
generations of peer-to-peer networks described above, the most legally significant lies in the fact that the 
client software itself plays no role in the indexing and searching functions. Without the option to attack 
the network at client level, the next point of critical failure appears prima facie to be the trackers of 
unauthorised files. However, from a technical point of view, this is almost as challenging as attacking the 
supernodes in the networks that use the FastTrack protocol. Not only are they numerous, but they are also 
based in many different jurisdictions, which poses an obstacle to legal action62. Most significantly, the 
BitTorrent network is able to operate without trackers. Most recently, The Pirate Bay has begun phasing 
out the majority of the torrent files it hosts and replacing them with magnet links. These links (which are 
mere lines of code as opposed to files) contain far less information than torrent files, listing the metadata 
for the file to be downloaded and, if present, links to trackers. As magnet links take advantage of 
distributed hash tables (DHT), trackers are crucially not necessary. Instead, the client upon receiving the 
data contained in the magnet link will start querying other peers in the BitTorrent network using the 
metadata of the file that is being sought. The information that would normally be held by the tracker will 
be hosted by many different peers (hence the table being described as distributed) and, as soon as the 
client queries a peer that holds the DHT relating to the file, the client will be connected to the swarm that 
is sharing the file. Once connected to the swarm, the other seeders will provide the client with further 
information on other members of the swarm so that more and better connections can be made within the 
swarm. Thus, BitTorrent is not dependent on either trackers or traditional torrent files63. 
Although some success has been achieved in indirectly using regulation by code to impede file 
sharing by utilising the law to attack the weak points of the first two generations of file sharing networks, 
the third wave in the form of the BitTorrent network is proving more resilient. Without trackers or any 
                                                 
62
 As trackers are mere proxies as opposed to central servers, attacking them can be thought of as comparable to 
breaking up rhizomes only to propagate them further; see David, ibid, 63; and Deleuze G and Guattari F, Anti-
Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Athlone Press 1984), 41. 
63
 Dramatico Entertainment and others v British Sky Broadcasting and others [2012] EWHC 268 (Ch), para.24-25. 
  
 
   
  
Michael Filby 
   
 
90 
 
other critical point of failure to focus on, rights holders or law enforcement bodies have little option than 
to target either the indexing sites that host the torrent files and magnet links, or the users of the network 
itself. Although litigation against individuals alleged to be involved with the operation of The Pirate Bay 
website has so far resulted in criminal convictions, the site itself is still functional and regularly updated64. 
This is largely due to the moving of the hosting of the website to numerous jurisdictions that do not share 
the same approach to intellectual property regulation as the US and much of Europe65, a task made less 
challenging by the space that the website takes up being dramatically reduced by the replacement of 
torrent files with magnet links. This and other websites are also capable of being hosted on what have 
been described as “PirateBox” units, which are mobile devices that are capable of broadcasting versions 
of any indexing site, including The Pirate Bay66, to any other user within range of its WiFi signal. 
Although the fact that such devices are not only mobile but completely bypass the internet itself renders 
them even more difficult to trace than sites hosted on the World Wide Web, they are presently limited in 
range to their local areas. Development of the concept is aiming to allow users of Android smartphones to 
perform a similar function which could see the PirateBox concept become truly distributed and thus more 
widespread, which would place another obstacle in the path of the goal of preventing access to these 
indexing sites. Although targeting users of the BitTorrent network is also viable in legal terms, as was 
demonstrated in the case of Chan Nai Ming, it should be noted that this particular case was applied to an 
original uploader67. But in a purely technical sense, despite past successes, increasing decentralisation 
means the task of using legal regulation to apply code-based influence to the file sharing networks 
themselves at the logical layer is becoming increasingly impracticable68. 
6. Using Code to Enforce Regulation by the Law 
But if the veins of the networks themselves cannot be stymied, what of the content that runs through 
them? The most direct application of code-based regulation to content is digital rights management 
(DRM)69, which can take many different forms. May defines two categories of DRM, namely, soft and 
hard70. Soft DRM takes the form of software that is installed onto the computer of the consumer wishing 
to utilise DRM-protected content which then monitors the activity of the user. The most notable attempt 
at utilising soft DRM was carried out by SonyBMG, which bundled DRM software onto its compact discs 
that surreptitiously installed itself onto the computers of users who attempted to play them71. The 
software was technically indistinguishable from a rootkit in that it secreted itself on the computer of the 
user in a hidden area. When discovered, criticism was made of the fact that the software installed itself 
without the knowledge of the user, and that it made the user’s operating system more susceptible to 
viruses72. It was also quickly rendered impotent by the hacking community, which cracked the software 
soon after it was discovered. The second type of DRM defined by May, hard DRM, is more common both 
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in terms of use and in meeting the characteristics of what is traditionally thought of as DRM73. Hard 
DRM is usually encoded into content such as music files, and is designed to restrict access to the file 
without permission most often through the use of encryption74. A music file that has been encrypted 
cannot be played, but if the user has been provided with the key to the encryption because they have 
legitimately purchased the track, or if the encryption has been matched to the user’s computer or playback 
device, then the file will be temporarily decrypted which will enable it to be played normally. DRM that 
uses encryption has two fundamental flaws. The first lies in the fact that a user who has permission to 
play the music file necessarily has to be given the key so that the file can be temporarily encrypted. The 
problem with this approach is that any encryption can be easily broken if the cracker has access to the 
key75. Thus, all DRM that uses encryption can be easily and quickly cracked. The second problem has 
been described as the analogue hole,76 which refers to the fact that the encrypted file must be capable of 
being played by the authorised user. When a music file is played, the sound can be recorded77, creating a 
DRM-free version of the file78. Thus DRM is less an effective a block to access as a brick wall in the 
physical world, and more of a keep out sign that requires “the buttressing of non-technological powers – 
states, norms, and laws – in order to remain effective”79. May argues that due to the weaknesses in this 
type of DRM that inevitably lead to its failure, hard DRM can only ever be considered to be a variation of 
soft DRM, serving little more than a monitoring function80. 
7.  Using Code to Circumvent Surveillance and Detection 
If code cannot be relied upon to directly prevent access, then performing a reliable monitoring function 
could theoretically, when combined with legal regulation, improve the application of enforcement. In 
order to take action (of a legal or technical nature) against an infringing user, the identification of the user 
must be successfully established along with the jurisdiction in which the infringement took place, and 
what particular infringement has occurred. This model of network regulability is described by Lessig as 
“who did what, where”81. This essentially describes the technical function that is intended to be carried 
out by the Digital Economy Act 2010, where rights holders are able to carry out a monitoring function 
that establishes all three of these criteria before the graduated response system is triggered. Enforcement 
of the Act is provided for with what are termed technical measures. These measures aim to curb file 
sharing by using what would be termed by Lessig as code to prevent the alleged infringer from utilising 
their account to access file sharing networks, or to reduce the efficiency of the networks themselves. 
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These powers will be available for use in addition to the existing power provided in the Copyright, 
Designs and Patents Act 1988 to block access to indexing websites. The question of just how efficacious 
monitoring and enforcement measures such as these are in practice is crucial to the success of the ability 
of the overall regulatory regime to carry out its function. To address this, it must be considered how users 
and the piracy anti-industry can themselves utilise code in order to circumvent such measures. 
7.1 Who is Infringing? 
Rights holders presently use third parties to monitor file sharing networks such as BitTorrent. 
Establishing the identity of a file sharer requires the discovery of the internet protocol (IP) address of the 
infringer. IP addresses are assigned to everything that connects to the internet, and are crucial to the 
operation of the internet in that they form the addresses that data packets are given so that the TCP/IP 
protocol knows where to send them at the transmission and carrier level. In simple terms, a user without 
an IP address could not send packets (as there would no originating IP to assign them), and could not 
receive packets (as the network would not know where to deliver them). IP addresses are assigned in 
blocks to the ISPs that provide accounts to anyone wishing to access the internet, and the IP addresses in 
these blocks are assigned to each point of entry to the internet. To discover the IP address of an infringer, 
the rights holder can harvest these from individual BitTorrent swarms, for example by joining a swarm 
and scraping the tracker (which, it will be remembered, maintains lists of IP addresses of users currently 
sharing an individual file in a swarm)82. The IP address, once obtained, can be traced back to the ISP or 
other body to which it was assigned by carrying out a reverse-DNS lookup83. As ISPs keep logs of which 
user is assigned to which address at any particular point in time, the rights holder can then obtain the 
details of the account holder associated with the IP address at the time of the alleged infringement. 
The technical problem with this form of detection is that it assumes that the user is connected directly 
to the swarm with his or her own IP address, but there are a number of ways that users can conceal their 
identities. For example, a user may connect to the swarm using a proxy server or by connecting to a 
virtual private network (VPN)84, with such services usually being hosted extra-judicially to avoid legal 
sanction85. Once the connection to the VPN or proxy server is established, the user can access the internet 
and join torrent swarms in the usual way. However, it will appear to any website visited or any tracker in 
the swarm that the user’s connection originates at the VPN or proxy, and thus has an IP address registered 
to the VPN or proxy server. The disadvantage from the perspective of the user is that VPNs and proxy 
servers that are available for use in file sharing networks often apply a charge for using bandwidth, 
although some free services are also available. Routing peer-to-peer traffic through a proxy or VPN can 
also result in a slower upload and download speed, but this is again an issue that varies greatly amongst 
services. In terms of surveillance, there is technically little that can be done to trace a connection beyond 
the VPN or proxy from which it appears to originate. Another similar option available to file sharers is a 
seedbox86. These operate similarly to VPNs in that they are networks that connect to BitTorrent swarms 
on behalf of users, the difference being that users do not have to be connected to the seedbox at the time 
of the transfer. This means the user can connect to the seedbox at a later time and download the file 
directly from it, thus leaving only the IP address of the seedbox with the swarm tracker87. 
True IP addresses are also hidden when utilising what are referred to as darknets88. One example of a 
darknet is provided by The Onion Router (Tor)89. After installing client software, the computer of the user 
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can connect to a network of computers whereby identity is hidden through the use of a number of proxy 
servers that are donated by supporters of the Tor project. When a user wishes to use the Tor hidden 
service protocol, the client software can request access by connecting with a circuit that runs from the Tor 
network of proxies. This will provide the client with encrypted information that allows it to connect to 
other Tor proxies via the use of a distributed hash table (which is spread amongst nodes of the network 
much like in a BitTorrent swarm) and, eventually, to the hidden server. In the context of file sharing, a 
popular network that utilises the hidden service protocol is FreeNet90. The client software, when set to 
darknet mode, connects to the network of other users running the software in the manner described above, 
and can then access files that are being shared amongst them91. Unlike in a BitTorrent swarm, files are 
split up amongst the computers forming the FreeNet network, as opposed to being seeded as complete 
files by one or more clients. Due to the architecture of the hidden services protocol and the fact that 
downloading data through a relay of servers means that the speed of the operation will only be as high as 
the slowest connection speed of a computer in the network, file sharing through this tends to take longer 
to successfully complete than with a non-darknet network. However, in both of these instances, it is 
impossible to collectively harvest lists of IP addresses and link them to specific infringements. In the case 
of FreeNet running in darknet mode, it is more appropriately referred to as a friend-to-friend network as 
opposed to peer-to-peer, as the client will only connect to those specifically trusted by a community 
known to the user92. The use of a friend-to-friend community can be a double-edged sword in that, on the 
one hand, small friend to friend networks make infiltration less likely, but the smaller size of the group 
will increase the scope for identification of individuals once infiltration has taken place. On the other 
hand, while larger friend to friend networks increase the likelihood of infiltration, identification of 
individual members is more difficult as the group is larger93. In fact, the design of Freenet makes the 
larger network more attractive to file sharers due to the fact that the more nodes there are in a network, 
the more hops will take place when packets are delivered to the end user94. When an infiltrator is 
monitoring which packets are being delivered to which user, it cannot be determined whether the user 
another user is delivering packets to the end user, or merely just another intermediary node95. The packets 
themselves are also encrypted, adding a further layer of complication to the task of matching data packets 
to specific files. 
An extra layer of anonymity can also be achieved by users utilising any of these types of file sharing 
networks by employing blocklists. Blocklists are lists of IP addresses that are known to belong to bodies 
that carry out network surveillance, often for the purposes of detecting file sharers. By importing updated 
blocklists into a BitTorrent client or by utilising a separate piece of software that sits between the user’s 
computer and the internet in the same way as a firewall, connections to these bodies to the user’s 
computer through file sharing networks can be refused. When Banerjee et al conducted a trial to assess 
the effectiveness of blocklists in peer to peer file sharing networks, they discovered that blocking the top 
five most active IP address ranges reduced the chances of connecting to an address belonging to a 
monitoring firm to 1%. Further reductions in the chance of detection were apparent when more ranges 
were added to the blocklist96. In contrast, it was found that without the use of blocklist filtering, the 
chance of a user connecting to a monitoring firm over the period of time that testing was carried out 
increased to 100%97. 
                                                                                                                                               
89
 Syverson PF, Reed MG and Goldschlag DM, ‘Private Web Browsing’ (1997) 5(3) Journal of Computer Security 
237, 237. 
90
 Clark I and others, ‘Freenet: a Distributed Anonymous Information Storage and Retrieval System’ in Designing 
Privacy-Enhancing Technologies: Procedures of the International Workshop Design Issues in Anonymity and 
Unobservability (Springer 2001), 46. 
91
 David M and Kirkhope J, ‘New Digital Technologies: Privacy / Property, Globalization and Law’ (2004) 3(4) 
Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 437, 442. 
92
 David M, Peer to Peer and the Music Industry: The Criminalization of Sharing (Sage Publications 2010), 83. 
93
 Ibid, 84. 
94
 A similar theory is the “Gnutella paradox”, which posits that smaller networks are less subject to government 
control, but will equally be more difficult to find and contain fewer files to be shared, although this theory pre-dates 
the popularisation of BitTorrent: see Brown J, ‘The Gnutella Paradox’ (Salon.com, 29/09/00) 
<http://www.salon.com/2000/09/29/gnutella_paradox/> accessed May 2012; and Goldsmith J and Wu T, Who 
Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World (Oxford University Press 2008), 123. 
95
 Hand S and Roscoe T, ‘Mnemosyne: peer-to-peer steganographic storage’ (Proceedings of the First International 
Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems 2002), 1. 
96
 Banerjee A, Faloutsos M and Bhuyan LN, P2P: Is Big Brother Watching You? (University of California 2006), 4. 
97
 Ibid. 
  
 
   
  
Michael Filby 
   
 
94 
 
 
It will be remembered that Benkler’s three layers of regulation – the content, code and physical layers 
– can only influence the layers below them, which is why surveillance applied at the content level can be 
circumvented with counter-surveillance applied at the code level. An even more effective way of hiding 
an IP address can therefore be achieved by bypassing the code layer and circumventing at the physical 
layer. In the physical world, this can be achieved by entering the internet through an access point that is 
not traceable to the user98. The most straightforward means of doing so would be to connect via an open 
WiFi signal. This would mean the activities of the user connected to the internet would be traceable, as a 
theoretical maximum, to the IP address that is registered to the company or individual that has left its 
access point unsecured, leaving no physical world connection between the two. Although connecting to 
an open WiFi connection would be the easiest option available to a user assuming such a connection was 
within range, a user who was extremely determined to avoid detection could connect through a secured 
wireless connection by bypassing any security measures applied by its owner. In architectural terms, 
weaker WEP WiFi security can be defeated by a user with the requisite technical knowledge within less 
than a minute99. The vulnerability of WPA/WPA2 security is more dependent on the strength of the 
password that has been used, with weaker passwords100 being susceptible to dictionary attacks over a 
short length of time, and stronger passwords101 being susceptible to brute force attacks over a longer 
amount of time102. Although this method of counter-surveillance is impossible to trace if the user carries 
out certain precautions103, it can be construed in certain circumstances as a criminal offence104. This is in 
contrast to the other means of counter-surveillance described above which, considered independently of 
illicit activities carried out whilst using them, the use of which are not in themselves unlawful. 
7.2 What is the infringement? 
A number of problems associated with detecting infringement through BitTorrent swarms by harvesting 
IP addresses from trackers related to particular files were highlighted in the case of MediaCAT v 
Adams105, which can largely be attributed to the evidential certainty of establishing that an individual IP 
address has been used to download a legally significant proportion of an unauthorised copy. This is 
because the IP address is taken from the tracker, but what data has passed to or from the user registered to 
the IP address has not been monitored. However, in Chan Nai Ming106, it was deemed sufficient by the 
court when Hong Kong Customs and Excise connected to the swarm and downloaded complete copies. 
This method can be used to establish that an unauthorised copy exists in a swarm, but linking them to 
specific IP addresses can be problematic. Although the court accepted that the original uploader was 
liable despite there being a high possibility that parts of the files would have been downloaded by other 
users in the swarm107, this was due to no meaningful effort being expended by him to hide his physical 
world identity108. 
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Another more direct way of determining what users of the internet are downloading is by carrying out 
deep packet inspection109. This is a form of monitoring that can be carried out at the network and ISP 
levels, and thus can be considered to be implementable at the physical layer. It will be remembered from 
the explanations above that computers connected to the internet send and receive packets of data that are 
placed in a container indicating the originating IP address and destination IP so that the transmission 
carrier knows where to send it. By intervening at the point between the internet and the user, the packets 
can be intercepted and inspected110. The inspection goes past the shallow layers of the TCP/IP container 
levels, and into the data level of the packet which contains the content. Successful deep packet inspection 
can, in some circumstances, theoretically detect when the packets of data the user is sending or receiving 
are portions of an unauthorised copy, or from what file sharing networks they originate. This would 
trigger enforcement through legal regulation, or by regulating at a technical level by filtering out the 
prohibited packets111. Although there are legal ramifications of carrying out deep packet inspection at the 
ISP level112, there are also frailties at a technical level. For example, if a user was connected to the 
internet through a VPN (as described above), traffic between the VPN and the user can be encrypted. By 
utilising VPN tunnelling, any data that is being uploaded or downloaded will go via the VPN which will 
securely encrypt the data stored in the packets before sending them directly to the user’s computer where 
they will be decrypted and vice versa. Thus any data intercepted between these two points, such as at the 
ISP level, that is subjected to deep packet inspection will only reveal encrypted fragments of data. The 
body carrying out the monitoring will therefore be unable to determine what data the user is uploading or 
downloading unless the encryption is broken, which is both time consuming and hardware intensive. As 
deep packet inspection is usually put in place at the ISP level where it sits between the user’s computer 
and the internet, it can be thought of as existing on the interface between the logical and physical layer. It 
can thus also be bypassed entirely by accessing the physical layer (i.e. the internet) via an account or 
access point that is not subject to surveillance. 
 7.3 Where is the Infringement Taking Place? 
Assuming the identity of an individual file sharer has been established and the particular infringement 
recognised, the final step is to ascertain the location in which the infringement took place. This is a task 
similar in nature to determining identity in that it requires the analysing of the IP address of the user who 
is being traced. Much can be gleaned from something as simple as a reverse-DNS lookup113, which can 
reveal the ISP the IP address is assigned to, and thus the likely location of the subscriber. This can be 
improved upon by cross-referencing the IP address against databases held by geolocation bodies114. 
Goldsmith and Wu assert that through combining these geolocation databases and subjecting them to 
computer analysis, “the geographical location of Internet users can be determined with over 99 percent 
accuracy at the country level”115. However, as geolocating involves the use of the IP address to which the 
user is connected to the internet, the process can be similarly frustrated by any of the measures outlined 
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above that involve hiding the original IP address and substituting it for another116. For example, by 
connecting via a proxy server or VPN, attempts to geolocate the user utilising what appears to be their IP 
address would reveal the country the proxy or VPN was based in which, if hosted in a different territory, 
would not even accurately reflect the home country of the user117. Therefore, the location of the 
infringement can be determined at a country level only if the user has taken no measures to avoid such 
tracking or hide their identity whilst online. 
8. Using Code to Circumvent Enforcement 
8.1. Site Blocking 
In addition to using code to monitor users of the internet in order to detect infringements, legal regulation 
can utilise several different means of using code to apply enforcement. It will be remembered from the 
discussion above that legal regulation can indirectly affect file sharing behaviour by influencing code. 
This has so far been evident in the successful suppression of the Napster first generation of file sharing 
networks, and the Grokster / Kazaa second generation. As the third generation, BitTorrent, as of yet 
remains relatively immune to the effective impediment of its network due to there being no critical points 
of failure that can be easily attacked, regulators have instead opted to target indexing sites by using a mix 
of legal sanction and enforcement by code. The US approach of attacking such sites has taken a two-
pronged strategy. By ordering (or persuading) US-based (and thus controllable) firms that offer hosting, 
advertising or financial services to these websites to withdraw the use of their facilities from such sites, 
even if they are based overseas, the sites can be driven out of business118. 
The second prong has involved ordering US-based (and, again, controllable) bodies such as Verisign 
to redirect the domain name of indexing sites to another site, which involves manipulation of the domain 
name system (DNS)119. As has already been discussed above, websites hosted on the World Wide Web 
require an IP address so that browsers know where to connect in order to view them. As IP addresses are 
long strings of numbers that are difficult to remember, DNS allows more descriptive strings to be 
assigned to these IP addresses120. There are many DNS servers placed around the internet that hold a 
distributed database121 of which domain names have been registered to which IP addresses. When a user 
types a domain into their browser, such as Google.com, the browser will connect to a DNS server to 
query what IP addresses are registered to that domain. As the database is distributed, the DNS server may 
refer the query onto another DNS server until it finds the correct domain. These DNS servers work in 
tandem under the auspices of a smaller number of root servers. When the correct domain has been 
identified, the IP address associated with it is sent back to the browser so that it can connect directly to the 
correct web site. In the US, Immigration and Customs Enforcement have “seized” a number of domains 
associated with alleged infringing websites122. This involves ordering Verisign, which is responsible for 
registrations under the .com top-level domain, to disassociate the domain names of infringing websites 
with the server on which they are actually based, and instead associate them with a website held by ICE 
that explains the domain has been seized. The US has sought to expand upon the legal power to perform 
this technical function with legislation such as the Stop Online Piracy Act, which would allow the DNS 
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redirections to take place further down in the hierarchy than at the top-level domain. By requiring US 
ISPs to amend their DNS servers, rather than requiring Verisign to change the root server, the websites 
would only be blocked to users who access the internet through US ISPs. Also, websites that use top-level 
domain extensions outside of US control can also be affected. This is similar in nature to the blocking of 
the Newzbin2 website ordered to be carried out by the ISP BT in the UK123, although this form of filtering 
does not involve tampering with DNS. The CleanFeed system employed by BT operates at the ISP level, 
and sits between the user and the wider internet124. As the user’s software sends out data packets, these 
packets are intercepted by the CleanFeed system and subjected to packet inspection125 to determine their 
destinations. The CleanFeed system carries a database of blacklisted IP addresses and URLs, which are 
checked against the destination of the packets. If the destination of any of the packets matches an IP 
address held in the database, the packet is forwarded to a secondary database of blacklisted URLs. If the 
destination of a packet matches the URL blacklist, the packet will be filtered out so that it cannot reach its 
end point. The practical consequence of this is that the user cannot connect to the blacklisted website126. 
These means of web blocking are effective in that users from the affected ISP or country will not be 
able to access the websites that are subject to the blocking measures127. However, there are 
countermeasures that can be employed by owners of the websites and the users to circumvent all of these 
types of blocking. In terms of blocking websites at the top level domain, many site owners choose to 
register a new domain utilising a top level domain from a different country that does not recognise the 
legal influence of the originating country. These new domains can then be advertised to their users so that 
access can be re-established. There is also software available to users to install in their web browsers that 
maintain a list of domains that have been blocked, along with alternative domains that have since been 
registered128. If the user attempts to visit a blocked domain by typing its URL into the address bar of their 
browser, the software will detect the blocked URL and replace it with the newly registered alternative 
URL or IP address129. If the blocking takes place at the DNS server level, then users can configure their 
computers to bypass ISP-level DNS servers in favour of DNS servers that have not been required to 
remove or redirect the listing for the blocked domain130. Software is available for users to install that 
automates this process, removing the need for the intermediate degree of technical knowledge that would 
otherwise be required. The browser software described above would also be able to successfully 
circumvent this type of block131. As the CleanFeed system does not rely on altering DNS to effect 
blocking, a slightly different approach to circumvention is required. If the blacklisted website sets up a 
number of alternative domains, the user can use the redirection software described above to automatically 
redirect to the site using URLs that have not been blacklisted before the CleanFeed database is updated132. 
The blacklisted URL can also be disguised utilising proxy services, which would again bypass 
CleanFeed’s detection. Newzbin2 has also made software available for users to install that automatically 
bypasses the CleanFeed system. Finally, the user can set up an encrypted tunnel to a proxy or VPN from 
which the blacklisted site can be accessed. As the packets are encrypted between the user and the proxy, 
CleanFeed will be unable to carry out any inspection of them, and thus again be frustrated. 
 
 
                                                 
123
 See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp and Others v British Telecommunications Plc [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch). 
124
 Clayton R, Anonymity and Traceability in Cyberspace (Technical Report No. 653, University of Cambridge 
2005), 115 et seq. 
125
 As the Cleanfeed system is only interested in the destination of the packets as opposed to the content of them, a 
form of shallow packet inspection is employed, not the deep packet inspection described above. 
126
 Clayton, ibid. 
127
 Clayton, ibid. 
128
 Bambauer DE, Orwell's Armchair (Research Paper No. 247, Brooklyn Law School 2011), 42. 
129
 Chaitovitz A and others, ‘Responding to Online Piracy: Mapping the Legal and Policy Boundaries’ (2011) 20 
Commercial Law Conspectus 1, 261. 
130
 Ofcom, '"Site Blocking" to reduce online copyright infringement: A review of sections 17 and 18 of the Digital 
Economy Act' (Ofcom 2011) <http://www.scribd.com/doc/61521898/Ofcom-Site-Blocking-Report-With-Redactions-
Removed> accessed October 2011, 33. 
131
 Bambauer DE, Orwell's Armchair (Research Paper No. 247, Brooklyn Law School 2011), 42. 
132
 Clayton R, Anonymity and Traceability in Cyberspace (Technical Report No. 653, University of Cambridge 
2005), 123. 
  
 
   
  
Michael Filby 
   
 
98 
 
8.2  Technical Measures: Throttling / Disconnection 
The DEA creates a new set of enforcement tools to be applied to ISP subscribers in receipt of three 
infringement notifications described as technical obligations, which UK ISPs can be required to put into 
place. These obligations are defined in the Act as limiting the speed or capacity of the internet connection 
of a subscriber (throttling), preventing the subscriber from accessing particular material133, suspending the 
account of the subscriber (disconnection), or limiting the service in another unspecified manner. It is 
difficult to fully assess the ramifications of these technical measures without more details on what they 
specifically entail. For example, if preventing the subscriber from accessing particular material means 
blocking the use of file sharing networks such as BitTorrent, means of circumvention would depend upon 
whether traffic shaping was implemented by, for example, port blocking or packet inspection134. 
Suspending the account of the subscriber is a sanction that would take place at the physical layer in that 
the ISP would remove permission for the user to connect to the internet via their servers, and cannot 
therefore be circumvented through the use of code. However, as the removal of service is peculiar to the 
home account of the subscriber, it can be thought of as being effective at one particular interface between 
the logical and physical layers. As the internet itself is still available at all other access points, the user 
can still utilise other unaffected points of access to the internet135. To do this legally, the user could 
connect using a mobile data connection or seek permission to connect to the account of a WiFi network 
that is within range of their domicile136. Alternatives that would attract criminal sanctions if detected 
include connecting using unsecured WiFi without permission, or circumventing the security of WiFi that 
is password-protected. 
9. The Threat of Plasticity to Design-Based Influence 
The purpose of this paper has been to test the “code is law” thesis in the context of Lessig’s modalities of 
regulation. Both Lessig and Reidenberg have asserted that code is a crucial element of regulation, 
particularly in the context of regulating intellectual property rights137. Lessig in particular has emphasised 
the contrast between the imposition of legal barriers in the physical world and code barriers in the 
networked information environment – where legal barriers can influence behaviour through monetary 
fines and imprisonment, code barriers do not so much influence behaviour as prevent it entirely138. This 
rationale is explained by comparing the architecture or design of the internet to a door or wall in the 
physical world, so whereas legal sanctions are designed to influence your behaviour in order to avoid 
them, code barriers perform the virtual equivalent of physically preventing you from engaging in certain 
behaviour139. This analogy holds to a certain extent. It is true that a door can be circumvented by picking 
its lock or breaking it down, but the former requires specialised knowledge and equipment whereas the 
latter requires a great deal of strength. The circumvention of a digital lock in the form of DRM, for 
example, requires specialised knowledge. But the crucial difference lies in the fact that a digital lock can 
also be defeated by anyone without specialised knowledge as soon as a single person has broken it and 
shared the tool (in the form of software), or the information that can be used to defeat it without any 
specialised knowledge at all140. The same distributed dissemination of knowledge that makes file sharing 
possible also makes mass circumvention possible. 
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The plasticity of the end-to-end architecture of the internet allows the regulator to customise its 
approach to regulating the online environment, but this is a double-edged sword141. While information 
flows can be shaped, diverted and blocked by the imposition of digital barriers, this paper has 
demonstrated that the same architecture allows for it to be remoulded so that efficiency of the flows 
remains optimal. Several commentators argue that this equality of design can be construed as a logical 
commons, in that the network does not discriminate142. This is accurate in that the ability to make use of 
the internet without encumbrance at the logical layer is equally available to all in terms of opportunity. 
But there exists a digital divide in which, on one side, exists an online citizenship that have the means, the 
knowledge, the will and the ability to seize this access143. On the other lies a group that may not have the 
desire to take advantage of the networked information environment, or certain aspects of it. But the 
proportion of this group that does not have the opportunity to acquire the knowledge or ability is 
diminishing, due to the increase in efficient dissemination and access144. Further, this efficiency in 
dissemination is being driven not only by network design, but by the intended use of code as an 
impediment to it145. It is this equality of opportunity that forms the logical commons. 
Although the fear that blocks implemented at the code layer may lead to censorship is 
acknowledged146, Reidenberg suggests that the possibilities of circumvention of the Lex Informatica 
default can be reduced by “forcing the technical rule lower in the network protocol”147. This suggestion of 
hardwiring barriers into the architecture of the internet would realise Lessig’s analogy to the extent that 
they would become as impenetrable as a door or wall in the physical world. But the end-to-end design of 
the internet requires intelligence only at the ends of the networks, with the “dumb” middle a mere 
medium through which packets are transmitted148. Currently, it is the intelligent ends that are being 
manipulated in order to circumvent the barriers that are constructed in open code layers accessible and 
mouldable by open terminals, i.e. PCs149. To integrate barriers more deeply into the stack would be to 
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transcend the intelligent ends where regulation by code is usually implemented150, and would thus require 
the orchestration of fundamental changes to the internet protocol151 so that the middle can become 
intelligent enough to itself be coded to discriminate152. But it is warned that to change the internet 
protocol is to destroy the networked information environment as it now exists153. The protocols of the 
internet were deliberately designed to accommodate the end-to-end principle so the underlying network 
could be as open and mouldable to future technologies (one of which was the World Wide Web) as 
possible154. Lessig points out that “This minimalism in the Internet’s design is not an accident. It reflects a 
decision about how best to design a network to perform a wide range over very different functions”.155 
Goldsmith and Wu go further than this in describing the “open, minimalist, and neutral” design of the 
internet as distrusting of centralised control, which was an embodiment of “American libertarianism, and 
even 1960s idealism, into the universal language of the Internet”156. If the internet was deliberately 
designed this way, then any proposed change to its infrastructure must be questioned157. In the case of an 
admired ecosystem, the burden of proof must fall on those seeking to alter the fundamental assumptions 
that brought it about in the first place158. Goldsmith and Wu proclaim that Vint Cerf’s assertion that there 
is something necessary or unchangeable about the architecture of the internet is a mistake159. This point of 
view is described by Lessig as “is-ism”, that because technology is plastic and mouldable, the way 
something is is not necessarily the way it should be160. Lessig justifies his point of view by highlighting 
Zittrain’s observation that the generativeness of the end-to-end network is good for creating technologies 
such as Hotmail and Google, but just as good for creating viruses, a view that he describes as “Z-
Theory”161. This is correct insofar as it cannot be assumed that the positive effects attributable to the 
architecture of the internet in themselves justify their continued existence, but it must also not be assumed 
that just because the undefined threat that lies at the heart of Z-Theory can potentially technically be 
created by the same principles, that they necessarily will. To frame the argument in the spirit of Lessig’s 
own theory of is-ism, just because a threat can potentially materialise, it does not necessarily mean that it 
will162. 
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So far, this paper has explored the influence of the legislature in attempting to regulate informational 
flows in the networked information environment, and the consequence of technological end-to-endian 
plasticity in the application of this regulation. We have seen that the regulator uses code in two distinct 
ways, namely, to act as a substitute for or extension of legal regulation (i.e. code as law), and as a bolster 
for regulability in terms of surveillance. These uses on both counts are, on a technical level, ineffective. 
However, it has been argued that technical ineffectiveness of regulatory code need not defeat the purpose 
of it163. The theory of bovinity posits that “tiny controls, consistently enforced, are enough to direct very 
large animals… I think it is as likely that the majority of people would resist these small but efficient 
regulators of the Net as it is that cows would resist wire fences”164. Framed in the context of a largely self-
executing structure, the driving force of the theory lies in the assertion that the average person will have 
neither the time nor patience to circumvent structural barriers, and will thus default to a desired course of 
conduct165. Hull suggests that the inconvenience of circumventing DVD copy protection will prevent even 
those who are technologically adept and unconcerned about breaking the law from circumventing DVD 
DRM166, whereas Sydnor observes that the theory of bovinity casts the government in the role of the wise 
regulator, able to defend users of the internet against threats from malevolent market forces and rules167. 
But this highlights a crucial flaw: “Lessig’s ‘bovine account’ of human nature equates most people with 
witless cows”168. Sydnor et al contextualised the theory with a data set that indicated that the architectural 
design of file sharing software significantly raised the incidence of uploading for a short period, before it 
was greatly reduced again. This suggests that the users of the software in this example were not as willing 
to allow their behaviour to be shaped as the theory of bovinity would dictate “given time, information, 
and incentives”169, which lends further support to the assertion that Lessig’s assumption is without 
foundation. This scepticism is shared by Doctorow, who categorises the two flaws in the “fallacy” behind 
the theory as technical and social. In the former sense, a user does not require the technical knowledge 
necessary to circumvent the surveillance or control, merely the ability to locate the knowledge on how to 
achieve circumvention from another person170. In the latter sense, small controls are designed to influence 
“the most unsophisticated and least capable among us”171. That the file sharing community is defined by a 
joint purpose of obtaining and sharing free copies, and has gone to great lengths to establish an 
infrastructure that enables its members to achieve this aim, does not fit in with the characteristics 
described by Doctorow, and thus undermines the theory further still. As Froomkin suggests, bovinity 
“only works so long as there is no particular felt need for what is being blocked, and no one is providing 
instructions on how to circumvent the blocks. The example of DVD region codes suggests to me that 
bovinity is overrated”172. 
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Figure 4: Influence of Regulation by Code over Online Communities 
 
 
 
 
The above figure demonstrates the extent of the impact of code, and thus legal regulation that relies 
upon it, on the behaviour of two simplified representations of online sub-communities based on the 
outcome of the above assessment of bovinity. Where a group chooses not to engage in file sharing, 
regulation by code exerts control that is effective insofar as the group does not engage in file sharing, but 
passive in that the group exhibits no desire to do so in the first place. Where a group does choose to 
engage in file sharing then, assuming they meet the characteristics necessary to be part of the file sharing 
community, they will be likely to possess the desire, the will and the ability to circumvent the surveillance 
or enforcement measures of code to the extent that they will not allow minor inconvenience to sway their 
behaviour. The overlap between the two groups represents non-file sharers who are showing a mild 
curiosity about file sharing, and the most casual of file sharers who do not share the intense motivations 
or drive of their community. This group is the most susceptible to being influenced by the inconvenience 
of circumvention, and thus will be the most likely to become non-file sharers. In a sense, Lessig’s 
bovinity is correct to a point, as this sub-section of the online community is positively influenced 
successfully by code. However, the theory falters in that the demographic over which code has the least 
effect is the same demographic that the regulator is most actively targeting; namely, the file sharing 
community. Thus, any legal regulation that relies on code to detect infringement or apply sanctions is 
liable to the same weaknesses that code itself is subject to, and will hence be limited in its ability to 
influence norms of file sharing to any meaningful degree173. 
10. Conclusion 
The two positions defined in this paper of this modality of regulation illustrate the two policy approaches 
available for the regulator to take in the institutional ecology. On one side there is openness, as 
characterised by Benkler as the TCP/IP protocol and the peer-to-peer networks that operate on top of 
them174. This is the approach that has been taken by the architects of the internet, the World Wide Web, 
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and now those who seek to enable efficient file sharing175. On the other side there is enclosure, 
characterised by legal anti-circumvention regulation and proprietary software that seeks to block, filter 
and exclude176. This is where the regulator is choosing to apply regulation by code, and this is where 
those who lie on the wrong side of the opportunity divide, or do not choose to step beyond it, are subject 
to it. If regulation by code were to be deemed effective, this would mean the strict application of 
paracopyright, a version of perfect control that trumps limited duration, fair dealing and de minimis177. If 
the present regulation by code were to be entrenched into a deeper layer in order to make it more 
effective, then the net, in the words of Lessig and Doctorow et al, would be broken. If regulation by code 
is not considered to be effective, then regimes that rely on code such as the DEA would predominantly 
fail to influence on a technical level the behaviour of those who choose to engage in file sharing. Yet the 
spillovers of the associated legal backing will still persist by affecting other avenues of openness, such as 
the provision of open WiFi178. At their worst, the legal overhangings might impede the innovation 
encouraged by the absence of barriers that has fed the success of the internet179. The gulf that exists 
between the approach of the regulator and the technical effect of the code is indicative of a fundamental 
disconnect between regulation by law and by code. This distantiation of approaches must be recognised 
by the regulator, or the result may well prove to be a “continual, and unedifying battle between designers 
of digital rights management systems and hackers, crackers and peer-to-peer systems”180. 
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